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Wealth and Envy in the Mongolian Gold Mines 
By Mette M. High 
 
This article examines how positions of power within households are related to new modes of wealth 
production at a time of drastic socio-economic change1. This topic has been a cornerstone in 
economic anthropology ever since Bohannan’s (1959) classic study of the Tiv and the incorporation 
of money into previously demarcated spheres of exchange. Whilst more recent approaches have 
considered how wealth opportunities are positioned within broader political critiques and moral 
evaluations of the relations of production, consumption and exchange (Akin 1999, Parry and Bloch 
1989, Taussig 1980), this article proposes to take seriously both the sociality and materiality of 
wealth. By discussing the different ways in which wealth is produced and conceptualised, I will 
demonstrate the significance of visibility for an understanding of people’s involvement in emerging 
economies. 
 
When thinking about life in the Mongolian countryside, we might imagine the open steppe land, 
small clusters of gers (tents of nomadic pastoralists, also known in English by the Russian loanword 
yurt) and large herds of animals grazing. Whilst a household member holds the barking dog, we are 
let into the ger and are soon served a seemingly limitless amount of salted milk tea. Casual 
conversation concerning the health of the family and their animals proceeds, and we are showered 
with warm hospitality and ready generosity. Upon leaving, we are given bags of dried milk curd, 
layers of clotted cream and bottles of airag (fermented mare’s milk) to take with us. Both within 
and beyond Mongolia, mobile pastoralism has enjoyed a prominent and somewhat romantic place 
in the imagination of what life in rural Mongolia is like. 
 
However, numerous historical accounts (e.g. Dawson 1980, Huc 1937, Montagu 1956, 
Ossendowski 1923) describe the longevity and importance of other industries in rural Mongolia. 
The country has a long history of not just pastoralism but indeed also carpentry, metalwork, trading 
and mining. Whilst regional research has given privileged attention to practices of herding, I 
suggest that it is time for a more inclusive recognition of what life in the Mongolian countryside is 
also about: herders as well as others. 
                                                 
1
 The research on which this article was based was sponsored by the Wenner-Gren foundation, the ESRC and King’s 
College, Cambridge. 
 2 
 
The event that makes such a re-assessment particularly necessary is the current gold rush that has 
taken shape in Mongolia since the year 2000. Both men and women, young and old, are taking part, 
and the number of gold miners continues to rise. Although the transient nature of a gold rush makes 
it difficult to estimate the number of people involved, latest statistics suggest that the national total 
in 2003 was in excess of one hundred thousand ninjas (Mongolian Business Development Agency 
2003:24). The term ninja refers to a person who mines for gold without possessing the legally 
required mining license and thereby evades state regulation with regards to taxation, environmental 
rehabilitation and land entitlement. Today, their number may have doubled. These numbers merely 
include those people who are directly involved in mining. In addition to the miners, there are also 
thousands of gold traders, shopkeepers and restaurant owners involved in the mining economy. In 
order to convey just how large this gold rush has become, it is worth mentioning that its estimated 
output by far exceeds the official production figures of the formal industrial mining sector, which 
alone contributes more than twenty percent to the country’s Gross Domestic Product (National 
Statistical Office of Mongolia 2006:116). Although mining is currently the fastest growing 
industrial sector in the country, increasing its output by more than thirty three percent per year, it is 
still not enough to keep up with the thousands of hands of informal sector gold miners who are 
panning for gold in riverbeds. Using simple washing pans, miners earn an attractive income with 
minimal financial investment and limited technical knowledge. Compared to the national average 
salary of around sixty USD per month (ibid.:261), gold miners can easily earn four times as much. 
The gold is there and people find gold every day. 
 
During my twenty months of fieldwork in Central Mongolia, the district of Uyanga became the so-
called ‘ninja capital’ of the country with a population of approximately eight thousand miners, that 
is, four times the entire herding population of the area. Although the physical separation between 
the grey, moon-like landscape of the mines and the green steppe is distinct and evident, the social 
movement of people and their implication in local economic circuits are not similarly confined. As 
people go about their daily life, they might take up alternating jobs and residence. As a result, 
‘ninjas’ as well as ‘herders’ are temporal definitions of occupation that do not exclude other 
professions. The term ninja is commonly used by the miners themselves, the general population and 
government officials in Mongolia and beyond. Apparently the term arose from the miners' 
appearance when carrying the customary green plastic pan tied to their back, reminiscent of the TV 
cartoon series called the Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles (Grayson 2006:37). 
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In the Mongolian capital of Ulaanbaatar ninja mining is commonly regarded as an economic 
phenomenon driven by poverty and desperation. It is perceived as involving hard working 
conditions, exposing oneself to intense violence and living amidst thousands of strangers. Ninja 
mining also requires of you to turn your back to the nomadic pastoralist heritage of the country, 
where fundamental taboos and practices related to the land enjoy particular importance. As 
thousands of ninjas pan for gold, large rivers are turned into stagnant mud, leaving humans and 
animals without clean drinking water. Moreover, as fertile pastureland is perforated with deep 
mining holes, connected underground with unsupported tunnels, mining areas will never again 
become safe for habitation. Although these environmental disasters have become an unavoidable 
reality for the country’s population, the gold rush is still depicted by advisors to the Mongolian 
government, including aid agencies such as the World Bank, as a “viable solution” to “the adverse 
effects of economic restructuring” (World Bank 2004:ii). However, to the general Mongolian public 
ninja mining is considered more a blemish, if not an embarrassment. 
 
In this article I will discuss the different ways in which herders and ninjas produce and 
conceptualise wealth (bayalag) and how such differences are related to local expectations of 
generosity (ögöömör zan). Contrary to popular opinion and the convictions of aid agencies, I will 
show why it is that ninjas who also engage in part-time herding are rarely poor and indeed often 
belong to wealthy local households. Instead of viewing ninja mining as a ‘poverty-driven 
phenomenon’, I want to address in this article why wealthy herders are attracted to mining. I will 
suggest that this involvement in the emerging gold mining economy has more to do with Mongolian 
ideas about patriarchy, generosity and specifically the obligation to share wealth than it does purely 
‘economic’ factors. 
 
An obligation to give 
 
When arriving to the district of Uyanga, the low-lying steppe land starts to rise tall, forests appear 
and the distances between gers increase. The herding family with whom I stayed for a year lives 
thirty minutes motorbike ride from the nearest village (sumyn töv) and apart from my host father 
and oldest brother, most of us never go there. Instead my host mother, my eight unmarried siblings 
and I go about our daily chores of milking, cooking and herding. Only occasionally do we cross the 
mountains. The relatives of my host father live in the neighbouring valleys, and whilst he often 
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visits them, we women only rarely get to go. However, when we do go, it is a special event where 
lovely food is prepared, gossip and laughter fill the air and warm farewells prepare us for another 
couple of months apart. My host mother is from a region sixty kilometres away and since getting 
married she has never been back. At times she longs for her natal homeland (nutag), but my host 
father refuses to let her visit. My host father makes all major decisions within our household group 
(ail), which comprises the main ger, the ger of the oldest son’s nuclear family and a small ger for 
storage. My host father decides when an animal should be slaughtered, when a member of the 
household group may seek medical attention and when the time is right for seasonal purchases in 
the regional capital. His decision-making power thus extends beyond his descendants and 
incorporates all affines who live within the ail. In this article I will refer to him and other household 
heads as ‘patriarchs’ since the power structure both within and beyond the household group is based 
on male seniority. When a patriarch dies, his oldest son thus becomes the next household head2. 
Compared to other regions in Mongolia, herding households in Uyanga seem to have a particularly 
dominant and conservative patriarchal structure3. 
 
My host father is a well-respected herder who is in his mid-sixties. With a herd of more than three 
hundred yaks and five hundred sheep, he is one of the wealthiest herders in the area and he is very 
proud of having achieved such a large herd without seeking recourse to so-called ‘money animals’, 
that is goats. As he says, “goats are money animals. They destroy the steppe, their meat tastes bad, 
they are difficult to herd because they like to climb up on rocks and the like. So the only reason for 
having them is to get their cashmere. But a real herder (jinhen malchin) doesn’t need money. So 
why have goats?” Although my host father proclaims that money is not necessary, he does go to the 
village a couple of times per week to sell our milk. When winter approaches he also sells off dozens 
of animals. He spends this income as well as their meagre state pensions on daily subsistence 
products, such as salt, tea, flour and the like. He is not a great spender and is indeed proud of being 
able to sustain his family in ways that are not too dissimilar from his father, grandfather and great 
grandfather. To him, being a ‘real herder’ means caring primarily about the animals rather than their 
                                                 
2
 If a herding family is very wealthy, they may at times insist on uxorilocal marriage instead of the prescribed virilocal 
arrangements. When the household head dies, it is thus sometimes an in-marrying son-in-law who becomes the next 
head of the household. In this sense, patriarchy dominates concerns about patriliny. 
3
 The presence of particularly powerful male household heads in Uyanga may not be a recent development. With 
regards to pre-collective pastoral residential groups in Arhangai (a region near Uyanga), Simukov writes “there is a 
clear tendency to join up in hotons [ail] according to kinship lines in this bag [district]” and “agnatic kinship between 
household heads was most important” (Simukov 1933:24-29, quoted in Sneath, 2000:214). Although Simukov 
discusses kin organisation, the importance of agnatic kin may highlight a local priority given to men rather than women. 
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wool and fluctuating markets4. Since pastoral wealth does not necessarily include money, I will first 
consider what pastoral wealth is considered to be. 
 
Herding households in the area tend to have yaks, sheep, horses and varying numbers of goats. 
Since it is now more than fifteen years ago that the herding collectives (negdel) of the socialist 
period were dismantled, people today rarely talk about current herd sizes as being in any way 
related to the past division of herding collective animals. Instead, people see large herds as 
reflecting admirable herding skills, peaceful relations with local spirits and the good general 
conduct of a household. A herder can thus be highly skilled and have detailed knowledge of 
pastures and seasonal changes but still not manage to sustain his herd. As herders do not willingly 
discuss the delicate matters of spirits’ blessings (hishig) and household relations, they rarely 
disclose exactly how many animals they have. However, they spend much time attempting to 
quantify the herd sizes of other local herders. Daily visits therefore often involve household heads 
discussing how many animals herders in Uyanga might have. Their comparisons not only concern 
the number of animals, but also other household possessions such as animal sheds, motorbikes, 
solar panels and TV satellites. That is, objects that are all visible, countable and comparable. This 
means that even if herders do not want to disclose their wealth, it is there for everybody to see. 
 
One day I was riding through a distant valley with my host father and with each ail (household 
group) we passed he provided an elaborate inventory of their possessions. He listed everything from 
the number of animals to Chinese motorbikes. I was surprised by his in-depth familiarity with 
households which I did not know he even visited. “It’s easy”, he explained to me. “When you see 
an ail you can immediately tell which animals they have got, how many of each, how they use the 
animal products, whether they are good herders or not, how many sons and daughters they have, 
etc. It’s all there for you to see (harah). Even if you’ve never visited the ail, you can still tell how 
wealthy they are. Here nothing is secret (büh yum nuutsgüi)”. 
 
The visibility of pastoral wealth not only means that households cannot hide wealth but also that 
others can constantly observe it. In moving through the landscape and passing each ail, you can 
thus see not only clusters of gers but also clusters of observable wealth. As ails are referred to 
                                                 
4
 Despite pressure to increasingly monetise pastoralism in today’s free-market economy, my host father seems to hold 
on to the ethos espoused by the specialised herding brigades within herding collectives that organised the pastoralist 
economy until the collapse of the Soviet socialist regime in 1991. These herding brigades were solely responsible for 
herding the animals, not selling animals or dairy products. 
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colloquially by the household head’s first name, such wealth can be seen to illustrate and objectify 
his persona rather than the collective household labour that went into its production. The household 
head’s name and person are given a tangible material expression that can be compared to that of 
others, aided by its basis in quantifiable entities. In this sense the patriarch has a lasting presence in 
the local landscape that cannot be easily ignored. In manifesting the peaceful incorporation of 
affines, the patriarch’s wealth asserts both his own persona and the successful continuity of his 
patriclan5 (ovog). Observable pastoral wealth thus expresses the local status of household heads as 
well as the enduring presence of their kin group. 
 
The visible wealth of herding households also leads to rising expectations of generosity. Whilst 
wealthy herding patriarchs are approached through highly respectable address and deferential 
demeanour, they are also met with visitors’ frequent requests for monetary and material charity. 
Almost every day distant relatives and acquaintances arrive at my host family with the explicit 
purpose of asking for help, ranging from generously reduced prices for animals to particular 
material gifts. My host father describes proudly such requests as testimony to his recognised 
accumulation of wealth and claims that by giving he performs good deeds (buyany beleg) that will 
ensure a good rebirth6 (dahin töröl). But, not all household members support his desire to be 
generous. 
 
Once, in a drunken moment, he lent his beautiful saddle with big silver decorations (möngön tonog) 
to a distant acquaintance and upon returning to my host family, they all insisted that he reclaim the 
saddle. However, to this day he has not re-visited the household and seems visibly annoyed by his 
family’s insistence, at times culminating in frustrated complaints about how “his own family 
doesn’t listen to him”. The conflict between the interests of the household head versus the other 
members is epitomised in their different interpretations of and responsibility for acts of generosity. 
Whereas visiting guests highlight the material achievements and personal renown of the household 
head, they also present a practical burden for other household members. As the household accepts 
the requests of visitors and thereby diminishes its overall wealth, objections are likely to arise from 
                                                 
5
 I follow Humphrey and Sneath’s description of a Mongolian clan as “an ideologically patrilineal kinship group, with 
its own name and identity” (1999:27). However, it is important to recognise the local variation in generational ‘depth’ 
of clans, post-marital residence patterns and clan rituals in Uyanga. 
6
 Despite intense prosecutions of religious specialists during the Mongolian socialist period, Buddhist theologies and 
institutions still have a dominant presence in the country. Closely related to the Tibetan Buddhist order of Dge-lugs-pa, 
Buddhism in Mongolia emphasises the importance of karma (the consequences of action) for the attainment of 
salvation. ‘Rebirth’ is thus a central concept linking actions of the present with a person’s future bodily manifestations, 
as portrayed in the Wheel of Life. 
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within. Since younger members of the ail can only obtain a share of the household’s wealth upon 
marriage, they often prefer to retain wealth within the ail rather than succumbing to the numerous 
requests from visitors. Moreover, in the case of daughters-in-law, although their dowry animals 
(injiin mal) are legally regarded as their own, they practically form part of the patriarch’s wealth 
and may thus risk being given away. As a result, acts of generosity may jeopardise claims to wealth 
advanced by both kin and affinal household members. 
 
It is generally only the household head who makes decisions about monetary and material matters, 
and visitors rarely attempt to make requests to other members of an ail. When visitors advance their 
requests, they give elaborate and emotional descriptions of their dire situation with so much detail 
that it seems impossible for the patriarch to dismiss their requests smoothly and easily. Following 
such accounts, visitors usually emphasise the unparalleled wealth of the host and the ease with 
which his generosity can be shown. The decision is thus presented as a question of the household 
head’s individual willingness to give, and not an issue of his material ability or social interest. A 
visitor’s request presents in this sense not just a material burden, but also an invitation for the 
patriarch to assert his authority domestically as well as publicly. By minimising potential envy 
(ataa) and accepting the requests of visitors, the household head asserts his position both within the 
household and in society at large. 
 
Since the expectations and demands of visitors appear ever growing, it seems the household head 
could end up surrendering the entire wealth of the ail to them. The patriarch must somehow decide 
the degree to which he shows generosity. However, when the household head refuses such a 
request, the visitor may become envious of the ail’s wealth and start spreading ‘malicious gossip’ 
(hel am). Any person, regardless of age and gender, can instigate malicious gossip7. The only 
requirement is in-depth information about the target, such as details of his or her family situation, 
kinship ties, number and kinds of animals, work chores and material possessions. The more detailed 
the information, the more powerful the malicious gossip is said to become. The calamities that are 
attributed to this malicious gossip concern attacks on humans and animals, causing them to 
suddenly and inexplicably fall ill or die. However, weather disasters, such as drought or extreme 
winters, and indirect human misfortune, such as encounters with thieves or murderers, are never 
associated with malicious gossip. Malicious gossip directly attacks the wealth that a household may 
                                                 
7
 Indeed, Højer describes hel am as “the ‘witchcraft’ of ordinary life” (2003:81). 
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have built up. Envy is therefore to be avoided at all costs since a jealous visitor can cause serious 
calamities for the hosting household. 
 
By accommodating household members’ personal interests in the wealth of the ail and thereby 
refusing to show generosity, the patriarch declines an opportunity to display his status as well as 
invites dangerous envy. Indeed, acts of giving can be seen as essential to herding life, beyond the 
visiting situations discussed above. For example, giving sustains the continuity of kinship in the 
sense of fathers separating their daughters from the patriclan (ovog) and giving them to the sons of 
others. Without such giving, households cannot generate descendants. Also, by carrying out daily 
offerings to spirits residing in the hearth and in the landscape, giving ensures the health and fertility 
of the herds. As herders offer milk, butter and fat to the ‘moody’ (aashtai) spirits, they hope to 
receive ‘blessings’ (hishig), which are considered necessary for a herd to grow. However, giving is 
fundamental not only to the reproduction of kinship and pastoral fortune, but also to Mongolian 
notions of personhood. In a recent article on funerary practices in Mongolia, Humphrey (2002) 
describes the dangers involved when someone becomes so attached to an object that it excludes 
others (horgodoson yum). If upon death the soul (süns) of a person remains emotionally attached to 
one particular object and refuses to let go, it may bring bad luck onto his or her relatives. Ritual 
intervention is therefore necessary in order to separate the soul from the object, dissolving the 
exclusive and possessive relationship. Achieving such separation, the object is then destroyed or 
given away, and a person and his or her soul (süns) can finally travel safely from this life to the 
next. In both life and death, refusing to give and let others have their share jeopardises peaceful 
living and is essentially anti-social as well as anti-personal. 
 
Although fundamental importance is attached to the act of giving, this does not mean that giving is 
necessarily altruistic and disinterested. I suggest that the Mongolian way of giving, in which a 
patriarch decides autonomously to part with some of his household’s wealth, is not an example of a 
‘free gift’ (cf. Parry 1986). By showing generosity, the giver receives not only public acclaim and 
the blessings of spirits, but also herding assistance as a form delayed reciprocity. Recipients of 
repeated generosity often assist the giving household in undesirable chores such as slaughtering 
animals, preparing hides and shearing sheep. In this sense, acts of giving assert hierarchical 
relationships within the household as well as far beyond it. 
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However, although what is given is sometimes reciprocated, it would be misleading to approach the 
generosity of herders in terms of the idiom of ‘exchange’ (see also Humphrey 1993:16). ‘Exchange’ 
implies reciprocation (whether generalised or otherwise) and assumes that what is given is indeed 
meant, by the actors involved, to be reciprocated. Moreover, ‘exchange’ also implies that what is 
given is in fact reciprocated. Such an emphasis on bilateral expectations and interactions risks 
misconstruing what, for Mongolians, makes giving an act of generosity. I suggest that it is actually 
the dissociation between giving and reciprocating that makes generosity such a strain on households 
(Bourdieu 1977:14, 171). With this powerful obligation to be generous, it is difficult for a herder to 
avoid altogether situations where he is expected to give. At the time of my fieldwork, my host 
father had a peculiar strategy for negotiating the social expectations of generosity. 
 
During any given day my host father spends most of his time away from the main ger, which guests 
associate with him, and instead sleeps, works and relaxes in a small, decrepit ger erected far behind 
it. When visitors arrive, they invariably ask where the household head is, and the reply is always the 
same: “He went out herding the sheep” (honynd yavsan), even when everyone knows that he is 
sitting in the other ger. In this way he evades visitors and in particular their demands for his 
generosity. In his absence it becomes impossible for visitors to make requests and, even if they 
know his ‘hiding place’, it would be considered rude for a visitor to enter his small ger. Such a ger 
is usually for storage or dairy production only and not for human habitation. It is also expected that 
a small ger, if inhabited, would be poorly decorated in terms of carpets and adornments, thus not 
appropriate for meeting a patriarch. In this way, I suggest that the household balances hospitality 
with carefully crafted restraint. In identifying the demands that are undesirable for the patriarch to 
attain to, he restricts his exposure to the financial requests of visitors and their potential for 
spreading malicious gossip. 
 
Concealing wealth 
 
Whilst I have so far shown how the possession of wealth gives rise to increasing social obligations 
and crystallises conflicting interests within the household, many herders are still interested in 
accumulating material and animate possessions. However, since pastoral wealth is constantly 
visible and countable, it is always on public display and not all patriarchs have extra gers to hide in. 
Instead, with ninja mining taking place only few kilometres from their households, herders now 
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have a new way of making increased wealth less visible and measurable. I suggest that by taking 
part in the gold rush, herders can achieve a higher status with fewer social obligations. 
 
In the mines of Uyanga, thousands of miners live in gers and tattered camping tents pitted closely 
up against each other. As the hillsides and valley floors gradually become perforated with mining 
holes, miners repeatedly relocate to different grounds in search of new suitable living areas. With 
mining continuing day and night, the appearance of an area changes radically within only a few 
months. With hardly any permanent structures, the occasional visitor relies on features of the 
landscape to provide orientation. However, as miners divert rivers, move excavation areas and turn 
hillsides into living quarters, nothing is permanent; least of all the landscape that is excavated at 
great speed. 
 
Despite such transient living conditions, a long-term visit will reveal a particularly lasting feature of 
life in the mines. Although people move at least once every few months, they tend to reorganise 
themselves in relatively stable groups of three to five gers. Within such clusters, people assist each 
other in daily household tasks and work-related activities. From early morning, both men and 
women call on their neighbours and other friends for small favours. Whilst women rely on each 
other for kitchen utensils, cooking ingredients and occasional help as babysitters, men often borrow 
each other’s mining equipment. Outside the gers men can often be seen hunched on their heels in a 
circle around somebody repairing his motorbike, sluice box or diesel generator. Packets of 
cigarettes and bottles of vodka are passed around and amicable banter fills the air. 
 
These networks of friendship provide the basis for work-teams where men and women work 
alongside each other. Depending on the location and size of the mining hole, work-teams number 
from four to sixteen with some people working above ground and others inside the mining hole. In 
some areas the gold-ore is deep underground, located at a depth of up to eighteen meters. To reach 
such a depth involves several weeks of hard manual labour. Equipped with only a hand-made metal 
pick, miners scrape into the hard stony soil and fill tattered flour bags with gravel and dirt. As the 
miners slowly make their way into the underground, workers on the surface use a simple hand-
crank pulley (libotok) to lift up the heavy bags and to transport workers up and down the hole at the 
change of shifts. When the miners reach the gold-ore, they dig horizontally to create a star-shape 
with several tunnels diverging off from the main shaft. 
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If the mining shaft is far from a water source, so-called “dirt taxis” (shoroony taksi) are paid to take 
the bags from the mine to the water. If the mining shaft is near a water source, the workers on the 
surface simply carry their bags to the water to start the panning process. Plastic washing pans 
(tumpun) are quickly filled with gravel, submerged under water and swirled around in large circles. 
The larger stones are taken out and the pan is then submerged again. The worker repeatedly 
separates out the largest gravel and eventually ends up with fine mud containing some shiny 
particles, mostly the size of snowflakes. The worker licks his or her palm before carefully placing 
the gold flakes in it. Storing the gold in paper from cigarette boxes, the workers take their findings 
to the locally based gold traders (altny chanj) and exchange the commonly called “yellow stuff” 
(shar yum) for cash. At the time of my fieldwork, ninjas received 1700 tugrugs (US$ 1.4) per 0.1 
gram of gold. From my observations among both miners and gold traders, I estimate that most 
miners earn a minimum of 5000 tugrugs (US$ 4.15) per day. This is a very attractive potential 
income that is comparable to those of white collar workers such as legislators, senior officials, 
managers and other professionals (National Statistical Office of Mongolia 2006:108). 
 
In addition to the simple and low investment panning technique, ninjas also procure gold in other 
ways. Another option is a soft plastic mat with small indentations (erzen). This mat is very popular 
as it makes the washing process much faster by lodging gold into its indented squares, thereby 
catching more gold. It is sometimes combined with other techniques such as a ‘drum’ (pajur) used 
in conjunction with a ‘water canon’ (usan buu). This mining technique consists of a manually 
modified metal drum with numerous holes, a handle to turn it and a meshed slide coming off below 
the middle of the drum. One person turns the drum while two others feed it with gravel, and another 
directs the flow of the water from the water canon. Whilst the heavy stones are released through the 
holes in the drum, the smaller metals are lodged at the bottom of the drum. A slide, which is 
occasionally fitted with the above-mentioned plastic mats, catches the heaviest small particles and 
the lightest are pushed through with the flow of the mud. By using this equipment, a team of at least 
four surface workers can process an amount of gravel equivalent to about seventy bags per day, 
earning an estimated minimum of 15’000 tugrugs (US$ 12.50) per day per person, whereas by 
panning by hand, one person can wash the content of no more than ten bags per day. 
 
As several different mining techniques are popular in Uyanga, it is impossible for almost anyone 
outside the individual work-team to know how much gold a person has found in a particular day. 
The variables are numerous and concern anything from the particular mining technique applied, the 
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location of the mining shaft to the precise organisation of the work-team. Firstly, as outlined above, 
miners use different kinds of equipment and this leads to variations in the length of work shifts, the 
number of workers involved and average recovery rates. Secondly, due to varying concentrations of 
gold-ore, some mining shafts yield much more gold than others, regardless of the technique used. 
Apart from these more general variables, profitability also depends on the depth and width of the 
mining shaft and the number of tunnels within it. All in all, this means that income levels are as 
hidden as the nature of the work itself. As the miners enter underground, so does the ability of 
others to ascertain how much gold they uncover. The covert quality of the mining process gives rise 
to an income that is non-visible and non-comparative. Unless miners directly enquire into each 
other’s earnings, it is certain to remain unknown to people other than the miner. 
 
In addition to the varying amounts of gold that miners uncover, they also spend their earnings in 
diverse ways. Upon selling their gold to resident gold-traders in the mines, most ninjas immediately 
spend part, if not all, of their earnings at local shops. As ninjas tend to work and socialise with their 
neighbours and other friends, rather than kinsmen, they are under no explicit obligation to share 
their earnings with others8. They can therefore decide relatively autonomously how to spend their 
money. Since a section of a gold-trader’s ger usually functions as a small shop, most ninjas 
immediately relinquish part of their earnings to the gold-trader to buy some of the goods on display. 
Whilst most of the products in the ‘ger shops’ (geriin delgüür) are subsistence goods, such as pasta, 
rice, deep-fried bread and vegetables, customers also buy sweets, cigarettes, cheap vodka and 
Korean beer. At the end of a long workday, miners often buy alcohol and take it to a friend’s ger 
where larger drinking sessions develop. It seems that, even if there is nothing to celebrate, there is 
almost always a reason to bury one’s sorrow in drinking. In the ninja mining areas empty bottles 
cover the ground and drunken people can be seen throughout the day. Having carried out fieldwork 
with both ninjas and gold-traders, I estimate that alcohol is the single most common and financially 
significant expenditure in the mines. 
 
The intense drinking is not only a way of momentarily forgetting about the harsh working 
conditions and personal injuries. Indeed, in social drinking situations ninjas engage in a particular 
kind of giving that leaves no other traces than drunkenness and vague memories of circulating 
vodka bottles. The generous giver swiftly opens his or her bottle and passes it around to others who 
                                                 
8
 Ninjas living in nuclear families do share their earnings and are expected to disclose honestly and willingly the income 
of the day. However, even within families ninjas often hesitate to talk about earnings and seem to try to spend at least a 
little before returning to the ger. 
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will then serve it to the group. Whereas drinking among herders is highly formal and ritualised, 
with explicit hosts and guests, drinking among ninjas does not involve the same degree of 
structured formality. As such, the identity of the giver in a ninja drinking situation does not endure 
in any social or material sense. By giving alcohol, ninjas thus give without necessarily being 
marked as generous. I suggest that this desire to ‘consume money’ is related to perceptions of ninja 
money as dangerous (ayultai), heavy (hünd) and polluted (buzartai). Since miners transgress taboos 
related to the land, their wealth is procured amongst upset local spirits. Moreover, in their search for 
the precious metal, miners also ignore the historical restriction on gold, associated exclusively with 
divine rulership (Allsen 1997:93). In pursuing the socially and cosmologically subversive acts of 
mining, ninjas end up with ‘polluted money’ (buzartai möngö) that can potentially damage its 
holder. Unless money earned from mining is ‘cleansed’ (ariulah) through elaborate rituals, its 
holder may suffer illness and general misfortune. As a result, people never invest such money in 
animals or other durable wealth objects9. Instead it is spent on fleeting subsistence goods and 
alcohol. However, having cleansed the money, herding families may spend it on a daughter’s 
education in the capital city or on a much needed operation at the hospital. That is, they would 
transact cleansed ninja money for transformative processes only. 
 
All these ways of spending money earned from ninja mining are entirely private matters that are not 
visible, countable and comparable in the same way or to the same degree as the wealth of herders. 
With the absence of obvious material indicators of wealth in the mines, ninjas are not obligated, like 
herders are, to display or discuss their wealth. Consequently, when ninjas talk about and compare 
individuals who have been unusually lucky, such conversations never concern people who have 
made less than singular discoveries. Whilst ninjas are interested in the different luck (az) of 
particular people, they are rarely as interested in their wealth (bayalag). Since luck10 is recognised 
socially through elaborate celebrations following large gold discoveries, the value of the gold 
discovered is publicly proclaimed and relished, whereas mundane daily accumulations of wealth 
remain private. As with herders, ninjas insist that wealth is not merely a question of how good a 
miner you are. Since the spirits of the land bestow blessings (hishig) upon herders as well as 
miners, finding gold is not simply a practical task of digging deep holes and panning the gravel for 
gold flakes. The amount of gold ninjas find is instead perceived as entirely dependent on the 
                                                 
9
 See Shipton (1989) for a comparative case on ‘bitter money’ among the Luo of Kenya. 
10
 When asking people about the idea of ‘luck’ (az), they explained that it was not related to spirits or their blessings 
(hishig). Instead, luck was described as an entirely unpredictable and impersonal quality manifested in the result of 
actions. 
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generosity of the spirits. Whilst knowledge of mining techniques and local geology may increase 
the chances of striking a gold vein, such insights alone are not seen as sufficient. Maintaining a 
good relationship with local spirits is thus paramount to success in mining. In this sense, ninjas may 
choose to keep information about wealth private for reasons similar to those of herders. To talk 
about one’s wealth is to disclose matters that are highly personal, powerful and uncertain. 
Moreover, ninjas may also prefer to conceal their wealth given the prevalence of violence in the 
mines. 
 
However, I suggest that people in the mines also conceal their earnings in order to accumulate 
wealth without becoming subject to the expectations of demanding visitors and, in turn, risk being 
targeted by envy and malicious gossip. As one of my ninja hosts said: “Although the mines are dirty 
and difficult, life here is still easier for me. Here no one expects anything”. Since such expectations 
are particularly pronounced in the herding areas, it is not surprising that many herders supplement 
their herding livelihood with a monetary income from the ninja mining areas. If a herding 
household has at least one family member who works in the mines, its wealth can no longer be 
measured by counting winter sheds and animals alone. Whether a herder is rich or not, then, 
becomes a guessing game as the expectation of receiving charitable loans and unmatched generosity 
is lowered and transferred onto other herders who have taken a different stance vis-à-vis ninja 
mining and accepted their necessary display of income. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Returning to the question of why my host father does not want to have so-called ‘money-animals’ 
such as goats, we are now able to see that such a statement is about much more than goats 
destroying the steppe and climbing rocks. By considering the sociality and materiality of wealth, I 
hope to have shown that money is a particular kind of wealth. It is different from having wealth in 
animals, motorbikes and lots of grandchildren. Money earned from animals is also different from 
‘polluted money’ earned from gold mining. However, in being concealable, all kinds of monetary 
wealth do not amount to as public an expression of the patriarch’s enduring position in the 
landscape. Money does not provide visible emblems of his success at appeasing spirits and 
incorporating affines into his household. Also, in lowering expectations of generosity, its holder 
may greedily insist on his or her exclusive claim to money. In personalising ownership and 
excluding all others, acts of taking rather than giving characterise its handling. As such, money 
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negates the physical expression of wealth and minimises its social potential. By refusing to let his 
household be partly sustained by the sale of cashmere, I believe my host father tries to limit the 
extent to which money, with its individualising potential, is allowed into the household. A stubborn 
yak bull or a new Chinese motorbike are then better conveyors of his position as well as his 
household’s future. Faced with a large gold rush, he insists that only herding wealth, despite its 
perils, presents the future for his family. 
 
What I have suggested in this article is that Mongolian informal mining is not a simple economic 
phenomenon that provides opportunities for the poor. Participation in the gold rush is informed not 
only by economic need but indeed also, more fundamentally, by Mongolian ideas about wealth and 
generous giving. As ninja mining has become one of the most important economic sectors in the 
country, it is important to move beyond representations of Mongolia as an essentially pastoralist 
country in which industrial practices are alien to rural life on the steppe. I have suggested that by 
examining the production and conceptualisation of wealth in the mining areas, we are better able to 
understand even the most fundamental notions of wealth, generosity and envy within Mongolian 
sociality and cosmology. 
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